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Abstract 
This paper reassesses the results of Japan’s financial deregulation over the last two 
decades.  Japan’s Big Bang sought to transform a highly regulated bank-centered 
financial system to a transparent, market-centered financial system to revitalize Japan’s 
economy and aging society.  Prior assessments generally view this reform effort as a 
failure due to Japan’s low economic growth rate.   
This paper finds, contrary to conventional wisdom, that government-led deregulatory 
and administrative reform was largely successful in removing legal and administrative 
obstacles to the development of a market-centered financial system.  However, the 
persistence of past practices by market participants and strong headwinds such as low 
macroeconomic growth and poor financial market performance prevented achievement 
of the Big Bang’s ambitious goals.  This illustrates both the limits of what can be 
accomplished through deregulation of financial markets and the problem inherent in 
using a results-oriented standard in evaluating Japan’s reform efforts.    
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I.   Introduction 
The “lost decade” of the 1990s in Japan has now become two decades, with the 
latter decade being marked by persistent deflationary pressure.  A number of factors 
contributed to this long period of low economic growth, including:  (1) significantly 
larger real estate and stock bubbles than experienced by the United States in 2007 (Katz 
[2009] and Ito [1992] p. 408), (2) monetary and fiscal policy mistakes (in 1989-90 and 
1997, respectively) as, at least in hindsight, the government removed economic stimulus 
too early, (3) a banking crisis beginning in 1997 which exacerbated long-term growth 
and productivity issues and which preoccupied governmental policy-making and actions, 
(4) an aging society with a declining number of productive workers that constrained 
economic growth, (5) pork barrel politics which supported ongoing subsidies for 
inefficient industries, particularly in rural areas, that exacerbated budget deficits and the 
national debt  and  (6)  bad luck, as the Asian financial crisis in 1997  and the U.S.-
initiated financial crisis in 2008 set back what might have otherwise been sustained 
economic recovery in Japan. 
The Japanese responded with both short-term fiscal and monetary policies to 
stimulate the economy and long-term “structural reform.”  Two core elements of the 
wide-ranging reform efforts were substantive financial deregulation under the “Big 
Bang” program initiated in 1996 and reform of Japan’s regulatory style from one of 
administrative guidance to a transparent system more clearly based on legal rules and 
their interpretation.  Such changes would help  transform a highly regulated bank-
centered financial system into a transparent, market-centered financial system (i.e., the 
often-cited Big Bang slogan of a “free, fair and global” financial system).  A newly 
efficient  capital market would, in turn, lead to a sustained economic recovery and, 
ultimately, to a new post-industrial economic model. 
Both popular opinion and academic literature outside Japan view Japanese reform 
efforts as a failure.  Many cite the substantive outcome--Japan’s continuing low 
economic growth, particularly in contrast to the perceived success of financial and 
technological innovation in the United States in the 1990s and strong economic growth 
in China over the past decade.   Economic stagnation is seen as strong evidence that 
Japan did not, in fact, implement the promised reforms to change its system.  However, 2 
 
this view is too broad and results-oriented to be used as a standard for evaluating 
Japanese reform efforts.   
Scholars have focused on the possibility that international competition among 
economic and legal systems would lead to global convergence, presumably towards a 
U.S.-based “global” or “standard” model (Hansmann and Kraakman [2001]).  Law 
specialists looked for a transformation in Japanese corporate governance from a 
stakeholder-based system to a shareholder-based system (Milhaupt [2006]).  Business 
school faculty speculated in the “varieties of capitalism” literature whether a Japanese 
“government-coordinated economy” could transform into a “liberal market economy” 
(Deeg and Jackson [2007]).   
Scholars in these and other fields (e.g., Haley [2005]) noted the lack of a clear, 
systemic transformation in Japan.  They generally concluded, or at least implied, that 
reform efforts were insufficient to effect “real change” in Japan and therefore not 
significant.  However, systemic transformation is rare and makes a crude standard for 
measuring the significance of reform.  Indeed, recent research efforts have begun to 
reconsider “all or nothing” transformational standards for evaluating change (Deeg and 
Jackson  [2007] and  Aronson  [2009]) and to look instead at the significance of 
incremental system evolution (see, e.g., Nottage, Wolff and Anderson [2008]).       
 Both popular and academic views are based on the questionable assumption that 
financial deregulation and administrative reform will naturally lead to sustained 
economic growth under a new post-industrial economic model.  This understanding 
presumably arose from the perceived successes of the U.S. post-industrial economic 
model and the prior “Big Bang” deregulatory programs in New York and London.  If 
deregulation and the U.S. model were successful, Japan merely had to “get serious” 
about carrying out reform along similar lines. 
The Japanese themselves appeared to share this belief.  They presumed that 
financial deregulation and an accompanying shift to a market-based financial system 
would address the fundamental demographic and productivity problems facing an aging 
society and mature economy, as follows:  (1) a higher return on private financial assets 
would ameliorate the problem of increasing social welfare payments in a rapidly aging 3 
 
society, (2) capital markets would more efficiently allocate funds to emerging growth 
industries and lead to higher economic growth rates, and (3) Tokyo would compete 
successfully in global financial competition and become a leading financial center 
(Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) [1997] and Toya [2006]). 
Furthermore, it was anticipated that not only would a newly efficient market-based 
financial system lead to the creation of a strong and efficient financial services industry, 
but that it would also pressure both the banking system and nonfinancial corporations to 
restructure and become more efficient and competitive.  The ultimate result would be a 
shift from a manufacturing-based, export-oriented economic model to a new service-
oriented, post-industrial economic model for Japan.  
The failure to achieve these ambitious goals has led to disappointment with reform 
efforts within Japan.  Although some progress was made,  large problems were left 
unresolved.  This Japanese view reflects concerns with process as well as substantive 
outcomes.  It includes a broad suspicion that continuing governmental regulatory 
involvement with financial institutions may have hindered the development of 
competitive financial markets over the last two decades and achievement of the broad 
goals of reform.  
Definitional uncertainties concerning basic issues related to the Big Bang program, 
such as its length and goals, complicate attempts at evaluating its results.  For example, 
the announced length of the Big Bang was 1996-2001 (already a long period for a 
“bang”), but many important  reform efforts began  only  under the Koizumi 
administration after 2001.  The immediate focus of the Big Bang was financial 
deregulation, and a question remains whether the three broad societal goals of 
deregulation noted above should be included within its scope.  These goals were cited 
by government planners (MOF [1997]) but may have been exaggerated for political 
purposes.  In addition, by the time the Japanese government went beyond the 1996 
announcement of the Big Bang into planning and implementing concrete measures in 
1997-98, it was necessarily reacting to a full-blown banking crisis (Cargill, Hutchinson 
and Ito [2000]) and already focusing as much effort on financial system stability as on 
financial system reform (MOF [1998] and Hoshi and Patrick [2000] p. 16).   4 
 
In seeking to re-evaluate the results of the Big Bang, this paper adopts an expansive 
view of its length and its goals, i.e., the Big Bang planners conceived a fundamental 
approach and long-term framework for ongoing financial and administrative reform that 
should include post-2001 reform efforts and the cited broad societal goals, even if these 
goals were not immediately or actively pursued.   
The overall Japanese approach suggests acceptance of, or at least hope in, the power 
of deregulation and administrative reform to bring about far-reaching positive effects 
from the efficient functioning of free markets.  The main thrust of deregulation would 
be aided by related reforms in numerous areas such as the legal profession (more and 
better lawyers to support businesses operating within a regulatory style based on legal 
rules), corporate governance (greater shareholder orientation by corporate management 
to increase investor returns and stock market attractiveness), privatization of public 
corporations, labor flexibility, and pension system reform. 
 The thesis of this paper is that despite the inability to achieve these ambitious 
societal goals, and contrary to conventional wisdom, Japan’s reform efforts were 
“serious” and were not a failure.  The Japanese government did undertake significant 
reform and made substantial progress in transforming its administrative processes and 
financial regulatory system.  The Japanese were largely successful in changing from a 
closed financial regulatory system based on an important  role for government, 
administrative guidance and administrative discretion to a more open system based 
largely on markets, legal rules, and information disclosure/transparency.  However, this 
change was insufficient to achieve large societal changes.  Although financial 
deregulation could remove legal and administrative obstacles and thereby encourage 
growth and investment, other more important factors must operate successfully in order 
to achieve greater return on investment, gains in productivity, and a higher rate of 
economic growth.       
It is necessary to evaluate Japan’s efforts without resorting to crude, 
transformational standards arguably based on an idealized U.S. model.  To accomplish 
this, we must consider the process by which financial deregulation and administrative 
reform could achieve the three broad societal goals noted above, and evaluate the efforts 
and results for each step of the process.  This process was not clearly articulated at the 5 
 
time reform efforts were initiated.  In retrospect,  we can envision  a roadmap for 
achieving the cited societal goals.  The first step would be government-led financial 
deregulation and administrative reform.  The intermediate step would be financial 
institutions, corporate borrowers, and other market participants utilizing new 
competitive opportunities to gradually transform Japan’s bank-centered financial system 
to a market-centered financial system.  The final step would be a more efficient 
financial system, combining with a number of other factors and broad societal 
participation, leading over time to achievement of the three broad societal goals and 
ultimately to a new post-industrial economic model for Japan (see Figure 1). 
The ongoing re-examination of assumptions and changing perceptions in the United 
States  following the 2008 financial crisis provide a good opportunity to reassess 
Japanese efforts to achieve market reforms and a sustained economic recovery. Japan’s 
experience of extraordinary policy measures yielding very modest economic results is 
no longer unique.  In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. and other countries 
were forced to take extraordinary “Japan-like” measures in both fiscal and monetary 
policy, including large budget deficits and quantitative easing to increase the money 
supply.  There has recently been serious discussion in the U.S. concerning the 
possibility that America will repeat Japan’s experience of slow growth and a lingering 
deflationary environment (Bullard [2010]).   
The 2008 financial crisis also challenged the assumptions of the wide-ranging 
positive effects of deregulation and the superiority of the U.S. post-industrial economic 
model.  It now appears that a portion of the gains of the financial services industry in the 
U.S. was due to a bubble or financial engineering unrelated to the real economy.  The 
lack of regulation in areas such as over-the-counter derivatives is no longer solely 
praised as a key to financial innovation; the risks involved in such a course have also 
become readily apparent.   
This paper is a broad survey that examines the appropriate standard for evaluation of 
financial system change in Japan, relevant data as available, and the results of reform 
for each step of the process outlined above:  (1) financial deregulation and 
administrative reform, (2) transformation to a market-centered financial system, and (3) 
achievement of the three broad societal goals.  It seeks to initiate a new discussion of 6 
 
Japan’s reform efforts freed of the strong implicit assumptions and perceptions of the 
last two decades.   
Section 2 discusses whether Japan was successful in achieving government-led 
financial deregulation and related administrative reform, and, in particular, whether 
regulatory style actually changed in practice.  It concludes that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, Japanese reform efforts achieved substantial success in the first step of 
financial deregulation and administrative reform.   
Section 3 considers whether there was a transformation to a market-centered 
financial system.  It concludes that despite a gradual increase over time in direct finance 
over indirect finance, reform efforts had a limited effect on market participants and did 
not accelerate the slow and gradual progress toward a market-centered financial system.  
Japan essentially remains a bank-centered financial system, and has not developed a 
direct alternative to bank lending in the capital markets, i.e., a robust corporate bond 
market. 
Section 4 examines the three broad societal goals that the planners of the Big Bang 
hoped to ultimately achieve through financial deregulation and administrative reform.  It 
finds that none of the three goals was achieved, and suggests some other factors that 
might be more important than financial deregulation in achieving these goals.   
Section 5 concludes that the Big Bang substantially achieved its immediate 
government-led goals of financial deregulation and administrative reform, but that the 
reform process was not generally successful beyond that initial stage.  This illustrates 
the limits of what can be accomplished through deregulation of financial markets in the 
face of the persistence of past practices by market participants and strong headwinds 
such as low economic growth and poor stock market performance. To achieve the 
societal goals cited at the time of the Big Bang, the Japanese government has now 
turned to a broader set of measures involving trade, tax, social welfare, and regulatory 
policies.  At the same time, continuing reform efforts in the financial services industry 




II.  Financial Deregulation under the Big Bang 
The Big Bang reform program carried out wide-ranging substantive reform of 
financial laws covering banking, securities, and insurance.  These reforms covered a 
much broader area and were more comprehensive than the prior “Big Bangs” in New 
York and London that focused primarily on the deregulation of brokerage commissions 
(Fuchita  [2007]).  Financial regulatory reform under the Big Bang represented a 
dramatic acceleration of ongoing reform efforts.  There was substantial new legislation 
enacted beginning in 1997 (see, e.g., Shirai [2009] p. 7).  Japan’s efforts were also in 
step with an international trend in bank regulatory reform in the late 1990s which saw 
independence of the Bank of England and the creation of the Financial Services 
Authority in the U.K. and abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act in the U.S.  At the same 
time, the Japanese also recognized that financial system reform would require a fairly 
long-term and gradual process.   
There is little disagreement that the Japanese carried out significant deregulatory 
reform of financial laws “on the books.”  Rather, the debate centers on whether Japan’s 
changes in formal law and regulatory institutions also resulted in significant changes in 
actual regulatory practices.  The conventional wisdom holds that, judging partially by 
the lack of positive economic results, these reforms did not greatly affect regulatory 
practices.  In addition, there are no statistical data available to demonstrate that Japan 
has substantially changed its regulatory style in the financial services area.   
However, there is persuasive indirect evidence of significant change. Legislative 
changes broke up the powerful MOF and replaced it in the financial services regulatory 
area with the new Financial Services Agency (“FSA”) and a newly independent Bank of 
Japan (“BOJ”).  An important practice in maintaining administrative guidance, the use 
of “informal” administrative directives not subject to legal challenge (tsutatsu), was 
discontinued in 2000 and replaced by a system of guidelines (kantoku shishin) that are 
issued following a public consultation process.  In addition, a new system of 
“American-style” no-action letters was introduced in 2001 (FSA [2011]), although it is 
not widely utilized. 8 
 
Even prior to the formal breakup of the MOF, the position of “MOF-tan” at 
Japanese banks, which was a crucial role through the mid-1990s in maintaining close 
informal relations between banks and the MOF, was abolished.  Today much of the 
“give and take” between the banking industry and financial regulators occurs at the 
industry level through the chairman’s office at the Japan Bankers Association, while at 
the individual bank level compliance officers have gained substantially in importance.  
Ultimately, financial deregulation and administrative reform greatly affected virtually 
every element of Japan’s postwar banking system (e.g., industry segmentation and 
noncompetition, administrative guidance, the “convoy” system of bank bailouts, the role 
of main banks, etc.).  
Apart from these structural and institutional changes, the movement from 
administrative discretion towards transparent legal rules is reflected most clearly in a 
corresponding rise in the role of Japanese lawyers over the last decade.  There has been 
significant new domestic demand in Japan for corporate legal services in areas including 
new financial products, compliance and corporate governance.  Japanese corporate law 
firms have grown very rapidly in the past decade to meet this demand and have 
essentially switched their primary role from one of advising on cross-border 
transactions to one of focusing on domestic work.  This transformation of the role of the 
legal profession supports the view that there has been a real change in the Japanese style 
of administration, as businesses now consult with lawyers on legal rules and procedures 
rather than meet informally with government bureaucrats (Aronson [2007]). 
Financial regulators have also significantly increased their involvement with 
lawyers.  There was little, if any, consulting with lawyers by government agencies at the 
beginning of the Big Bang process in the mid-1990s.  Today, not only do financial 
regulatory agencies consult regularly with outside attorneys, it has become very 
common for young lawyers at the leading corporate law firms to work temporarily 
inside regulatory agencies for a few years on “secondment.”  The FSA is the largest 
temporary employer of such lawyers, and other financial regulatory agencies also use 
them (Aronson [2009] p. 231).  Although this trend is significant, its limits are indicated 
by a general lack of permanent lawyer positions at these agencies and by the lack of an 
enforcement division staffed by lawyers. 9 
 
The prevailing viewpoint, argued most vigorously by foreign bankers in Japan and 
their attorneys, is that the Japanese regulatory system has not really changed.  
According to this view, the structure of regulatory agencies and the substance of 
regulations may look different, but the heavy hand of regulation is still present and it 
does not welcome foreign participants in Tokyo’s financial market.  In other words, 
formal legal controls have been replaced by the use of informal controls, such as bank 
examinations, to achieve largely similar results.  This is an important point since it 
directly relates to whether market participants were, in fact, free to compete fully in 
areas such as the provision of new financial products and services.  However, this is a 
difficult argument to evaluate in a comparative context both because it is often 
anecdotal and because in every advanced economy banks and financial services present 
significant risks and attract the highest level of regulatory interest of any industry.   
The faults ascribed to Japanese regulatory agencies are also often vague, and can 
include phrases like “need to build trust” and “lack of communication.”  It is worth 
noting that such concerns would also be consistent with a financial regulatory system 
that had moved substantially from an informal administrative model to a model based 
on transparent legal rules.  In such case, the old informal means of communication 
would necessarily need to be replaced with the enforcement of new rules.  Such rules 
include FSA-published guidance and bank examination policies that could appear to be 
more one-sided and less interactive than the traditional approach, and which might also 
raise new issues of trust and communication.    
The standard for achieving significant reform should not require Japanese regulation 
moving from a system of “heavy” rules-based regulation to a system of “light” 
principles-based regulation, as advocated by foreign financial institutions (International 
Bankers Association [2007] p. 12), despite FSA rhetoric in the mid-2000s that it would 
change its regulatory style in that direction.  Rather, the key issue is one of regulatory 
style—i.e., whether Japan has moved to a more open, rules-based system rather than 
relying on closed, informal interactions with government agencies.  By this measure, 
Japan has arguably achieved substantial regulatory reform. 
Transparency is related to clear rules, but it also depends on the public disclosure of 
information.  Beginning with the Administrative Procedures Act of 1993, Japan has 10 
 
gradually moved to a system with public comments for proposed regulations, disclosure 
of discussions of deliberation councils that debate proposed legislation and regulations, 
and disclosure of enforcement actions.  The website of any major government agency in 
Japan now contains a significant amount of information on relevant laws, policies, and 
activities disclosed in a timely manner.  Ongoing corporate law reform has also resulted 
in the 2000s in increased information disclosure by public corporations (Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006 or so-called “J-SOX”) that would help support 
stronger capital markets and a requirement for broad internal control systems that go 
beyond financial accounting and cover risk management policies (Companies Act of 
2005). 
The process of regulatory and administrative reform has continued following the 
enactment of this legislation.  In 2007, at the height of concern about international stock 
market competition and consolidation, the FSA launched a “Better Market Initiative” 
(FSA  [2007]).  One of the four pillars of this effort was improving the regulatory 
environment through an “optimal combination” of rules-based and principles-based 
regulatory approaches, greater dialogue with the  financial  industry, and “increasing 
transparency and predictability of regulation and supervision” (FSA [2007]).    
Examples of recent reform measures implemented through legislative amendment and 
administrative action include relaxation of firewalls separating the banking, securities, 
and insurance industries, agreement between the FSA and the financial industry on 14 
shared general principles to form the basis of partial principles-based regulation, and the 
expanded use of no-action letters.   
Judging the extent of change in Japan’s regulation and regulatory style in the 
financial services area is also complicated by governmental reaction to changed 
circumstances over time—it is not a unidirectional process.  It is widely acknowledged 
that the initial Big Bang deregulation in 1998 increased competition in Japan’s financial 
services industry, chiefly through the increased sales of mutual funds  by  banks.  
However, increased securities sales also revealed weaknesses in information disclosure 
and advice on suitability provided to customers, and that  resulted in a degree of 
“reregulation” for investor protection under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act 
of 2006. 11 
 
Similarly, as noted previously, the initial 1998 reforms occurred at a time of an 
ongoing banking crisis that necessitated continuing close governmental supervision of 
the weak Japanese banking system.  As this situation gradually improved over time, the 
FSA announced that it would move toward principles-based regulation, but has made 
only limited progress in that direction as compared to the UK. 
In sum, although regulatory issues remain  and calls for more user-friendly 
regulation continue,  the changes over time have been significant.  Government-led 
deregulatory and administrative reform was likely sufficient to remove legal and 
administrative obstacles and thereby permit the development of a market-centered 
financial system.     
III.  Transformation to a Market-Centered Financial System 
This section considers whether government-led financial deregulation  and 
administrative reform affected the behavior of market participants and led to a shift 
from a bank-centered system of indirect finance to a market-centered system of direct 
finance.  Progress towards this goal can be measured generally through flow of funds 
data from the BOJ (excerpted in Table 1). Data show the total of all forms of corporate 
finance increasing in the 1980s, leveling in the 1990s, and gradually decreasing during 
the past decade.  The substantial decrease between 1995 and 2005 was caused by a 
decline in loan volume, as equity issuance increased modestly during that time period.  
The ratio of loans to equity (“shares and other equities”) for nonfinancial corporations 
was roughly 6 times (6x) in 1980, 5x in 1990, 3x in 2000 and 2x in 2009.  In essence, 
the data indicate a very slow, but substantial movement in the direction of a greater role 
for equity finance. 
The question is whether this gradual shift to direct finance has made a real 
difference in the efficiency of Japan’s financial system.  The data are somewhat 
ambiguous.  Stock issuance has increased relative to loan volume over the past decade 
primarily because of a decline in loan volume on corporate balance sheets beginning in 
1996.  However, the annual flow of funds data do not indicate that financial 
deregulation and other reform measures had any clear impact on the longstanding, 
gradual trend of moving from bank loans to equity financing.  The gradual reduction in 12 
 
the volume of bank loans might also be substantially accounted for by banks writing 
down nonperforming loans in response to tougher, post-banking crisis, regulation and 
by an overall absence of corporate demand for funding in a weak economy.   
Some academic commentators that closely follow the Japanese banking system have 
concluded that Japan has substantially transformed to a market-centered financial 
system (Hoshi and Patrick [2000]).  The reasons cited are a loss of governmental 
protection of banks from capital markets, data on the long-term trend of direct finance 
gradually replacing indirect finance, and the greater financing choices for large 
corporate borrowers.  However, from the broader perspective of the financial system as 
a whole, most commentators still broadly characterize Japan as having a bank-
dominated financial system that is relatively inefficient. 
This majority view focuses more on the comparison between bank loans and the 
weak corporate bond market.  Commentators have long pointed to Japan’s weak bond 
markets  as the biggest difference between financial systems in  Japan and the U.S. 
following the beginning of Japan’s deregulation efforts in the 1980s (Ito [1992] p. 105).  
Despite the substantial relative increase in direct equity finance, Japan’s financial 
system continues to have an overreliance on intermediated bank lending in its debt 
market and to exhibit the problems typically related to such overreliance:  
nonperforming loans, excess liquidity, and insufficient investment choices (see, e.g., 
Batten and Szilagyi [2003]).  And even within the field of corporate lending, banks 
dominate such lending in Japan while nonbank financial institutions play the primary 
role in the U.S. (BOJ [2010b]).  Japanese government studies continue to recognize this 
overreliance on bank lending and call for greater diversification of financing sources 
(Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy [2005] pp. 30-31).   
Financial deregulation did not affect one of the long-standing problems of Japan’s 
financial system—the lack of a corporate bond market commensurate with the size and 
maturity of Japan’s economy and industry.  Generally speaking, a capital market system 
is presumably better than a bank–centered financial system for a large economy as the 
higher costs of disclosure, regulation and enforcement that accompany a market-
centered financial system are outweighed by the benefits of providing a large volume of 
cheap capital (Kanda [2005]).  The same tradeoff is also generally true for individual 13 
 
corporations, as large businesses in the U.S. often favor bonds over bank loans due to 
lower cost and greater flexibility (although the growth of syndicated bank loans and 
securitization of bank loans has somewhat muddied this traditional distinction).   
Of even greater importance than providing low-cost funds is the potential for capital 
markets to allocate resources more efficiently to their greatest productive use.  A robust 
Japanese corporate bond market may therefore be essential to provide a true alternative 
to bank lending and to obtain the full anticipated benefits of capital market efficiency.   
From a comparative perspective, offerings in the U.S. the corporate bond market are 
some 17.5 times larger than the value of stock underwritings (as of 2003), while in 
Japan the corporate bond market is less than half the size of the stock market.  In 
fairness, the U.S. was historically the only country which had a fully developed 
corporate bond market, as European countries such as Germany also relied heavily on 
bank lending.  However, European corporate bond issuance has risen over the past 
decade with the creation of a Euromarket in corporate bonds and an increased desire by 
European companies for diversification of financing methods.  Japan’s corporate bond 
market is now strikingly small compared to both the U.S. and the EU, as measured, for 
example, by the size of the corporate bond market in relation to the economy (Japan 
Securities Dealers Association [2010] p. 1). 
The effects of Japan’s missed opportunity to develop a substantial corporate bond 
market are not only domestic.  Japan is the only economy in Asia with the capability of 
developing a large corporate bond market, and it is in a position to make a significant 
contribution to the functioning and integration of financial markets in Asia.  This would 
also act to strengthen Japan’s domestic financial services industry and its economy, as 
closer economic and financial ties with Asia are frequently cited as an important 
measure for the revitalization of Japan’s economy. 
However, the corporate bond market in Japan remains quite small.  Historically, 
legal and administrative obstacles hindered the development of a corporate bond market.  
Deregulation measures were undertaken (in particular, removal of issuer limitations in 
1996) and resulted in the creation of a bond market infrastructure which is “reasonably 
well developed” to support market growth (Ichiue [2006] p. 92).  However, significant 14 
 
corporate bond market growth has not occurred.  As of 2008 corporate bonds 
constituted only 5.8% of the Japanese bond market (Japan Securities Dealers 
Association [2009]). 
This pattern—the removal of legal obstacles not leading to the development of a 
robust market—is by no means limited to corporate bonds.  It also applies to a variety of 
new financial products such as exchange traded funds (ETFs), securitizations, and 
REITs (although many consider the J-REIT market to be a relative or partial success) 
and the slow growth of liberalized markets such as over-the-counter foreign exchange 
and derivatives (Shirai [2009]).  The failure of new financial products is often generally 
attributed to risk-averse Japanese investors and a corresponding lack of demand.  
However, the corporate bond market stands out prominently because bonds represent a 
relatively low-risk investment, and there is persuasive anecdotal evidence of a healthy 
potential demand for domestic corporate bonds and bond funds from both institutional 
and individual investors in Japan. 
We must therefore look to the supply side, i.e. corporate issuers, for an explanation 
why a robust Japanese corporate bond market has failed to develop.  The most often-
cited factor is corporations’ easy accessibility to bank loans due to the persistence of 
traditional relationship lending practices by Japanese banks, combined with the existing 
weak corporate bond market that fails to provide a fully viable alternative.  Even weak 
corporate borrowers can readily obtain bank loans, and banks have continued to provide 
forbearance lending to “zombie” corporations (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap [2006]).  
On the other hand, there is nearly a complete lack of high-yield bond issuance by non-
investment grade corporations in Japan, although that particular market is also 
hampered by restrictions limiting many institutional investors to investment grade 
bonds.   
Big Bang reforms have significantly affected the banking industry.  The roles of the 
main bank and keiretsu have weakened and the banking industry has undergone a 
dramatic consolidation across traditional group lines. However, the primary result of 
regulatory changes designed to increase competition has been banks reducing interest 
rates on loans to compete with each other.  They have not been required to become 
more efficient profit-oriented lenders to compete with a corporate bond market.   15 
 
Japanese banks, like Japanese corporations generally, have traditionally emphasized 
market share over profitability and remain consistently less profitable than U.S. banks.  
Over the last decade, Japanese banks had lower profitability in terms of both net interest 
rate spread (1% lower) and return on assets (1.2% lower) (Igata, Taki and Yoshikawa 
[2009] p. 22).  Thus, the hope that increased competition from more efficient capital 
markets would also lead to a more efficient bank-led finance market has not been 
realized.  Although the appeal of corporate bonds is generally thought to be their low 
cost compared to bank loans, the opposite is said to be true in Japan (Japan Securities 
Dealers Association [2010] p. 4).  
The tendency of Japanese banks to engage in low-margin relationship lending is 
exacerbated by excess funds from deposits and the need to utilize such funds.  Low 
interest rates paid on deposits means that banks can still obtain a small spread on low 
interest loans to corporate borrowers.  Furthermore, bank loans in Japan may already 
contain relatively weak covenants and be relatively easy to restructure as necessary with 
friendly banks—two other factors that would generally lead large corporations to favor 
bonds over bank loans in the United States. 
Finally, there may be ingrained habits  and existing images which discourage a 
corporate bond market.  Many large Japanese companies have issued convertible bonds 
(which are essentially equity), but not straight corporate bonds and corporations seem to 
conflate the two.  In addition, most Japanese investors’ exposure to corporate bonds is 
limited to the small number of historically top-rated issuers and does not extend to   the 
typical investment grade issuers that are common in the United States.  
As a result, although there has been a substantial, if very gradual, increase in direct 
finance in Japan over time, there has probably not been a sufficient transformation of 
the financial system to obtain the benefits from market efficiency envisioned at the time 
of the Big Bang.  The persistence of traditional bank lending and the failure of market 
participants to develop a corporate bond market despite financial  deregulation is 
arguably the largest stumbling block in the process of governmental deregulation 
leading to achievement of broad societal goals.  Ironically, one hope for the 
development of a corporate bond market may lie in strengthening bank regulation rather 
than in deregulation, i.e., the possibility of tougher international capital adequacy 16 
 
requirements for banks under the Basel III accord that would pressure all large Japanese 
banks to exit from low interest, unprofitable loans. 
IV. Failure to Achieve Broad Societal Goals 
Despite substantial completion of the first step of government-led financial 
deregulation and administrative reform, the Big Bang failed to achieve the broad society 
goals that were announced at the time of its inception.  In this section, the paper 
provides the available evidence on the lack of progress in achieving these goals.  It also 
suggests some additional significant factors, beyond deregulation and market efficiency, 
that may be necessary to achieve such goals. 
A. Higher Return on Private Financial Assets 
One of the highly conspicuous arguments at the time of the Big Bang was the need 
and opportunity to invest some of the 1,200 trillion yen in private savings and obtain a 
higher market return than provided by bank savings accounts (MOF [1997]).  Achieving 
this goal would help provide ample assets for private retirement and for governmental 
social welfare payments, and would enable Japan to regain an important role in the 
international community. 
The Big Bang was expected to produce private investment by increasing 
competition among financial service providers which, in turn, would produce a wider 
range of attractive financial products and investor-friendly services.  However, the trend 
of household savings and investment has gone in the other direction—the percentage of 
bank savings  (“cash and deposits”)  within  all  household financial assets has been 
increasing and now occupies nearly 55% (see Table 2).  This contrasts with about 14% 
in the U.S. (Japan Securities Dealers Association [2010] Appendix 8 p.3).  Conversely, 
Japanese households hold 6.4% of financial assets in shares and equities, while this 
percentage reaches 31.4% in the U.S. (BOJ [2010b]).   
The widely-cited necessity of investing household savings and earning a higher 
return is as strong today as it was 15 years ago.  In the interim, the total amount of 
private savings has increased from 1,200 trillion yen to over 1,500 trillion yen.  Why 
has no progress been made? 17 
 
There was, in fact, significant deregulation and encouragement of the asset 
management industry in Japan beginning in the mid-1990s.  The number of financial 
services providers and products has increased, and today individuals can easily purchase 
stock investment trusts (the Japanese equivalent of stock mutual funds) and other 
investment securities at bank counters (although corporate bond funds are very limited).  
However, other more important factors were not present or had a negative impact (MOF 
[2001]). 
First is market performance.  Individual investors (and the mutual funds which must 
attract such investors) tend to chase performance and invest during rising markets.  The 
stock market in Japan, at least as measured by the Nikkei index, lost approximately 3/4 
of its value when the bubble collapsed in the early 1990s and has been essentially flat 
for the past 20 years.  Japanese investment in stocks has also been flat.  In the United 
States as well, poor stock market returns following the tech stock market crash in 2000 
reversed the trend of increased stock and bond ownership which had persisted from 
1989-2001 (Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association  [2008] p.  7).  In both countries,  stock ownership declined 
significantly following the 2008 financial crisis and stock market crash, and began to 
rise (end of 2010-early 2011) well after the stock market had staged a dramatic recovery 
from its 2009 low.  
Second, employment instability, relatively high unemployment rates (for Japan), and 
low wage increases endured during much of the past two decades.  Beginning around 
1997, there has been a widespread trend for Japanese companies to rely extensively on 
part-time and temporary labor.  New job openings and the percentage of graduating 
college seniors able to find full-time employment have plummeted over the past few 
years.  This trend, together with an aging society, resulted in lower savings rates and has 
encouraged risk-averse behavior with financial assets.   
Third is the lack of any necessity for many Japanese to invest in risk assets.  In the 
U.S., the trend of increasing household ownership of equities and bonds during the 
1990s coincided with a decrease in traditional pensions in the form of defined benefit 
plans and an increase in 401(k) and other defined contribution plans (Investment 
Company Institute and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association [2008] 18 
 
p. 1).  This left many individuals with essentially no choice—employers stopped being 
responsible for investment of employee funds (and guaranteeing a fixed level of return) 
and the responsibility was shifted to individuals.  During the long bull market from the 
early 1980s to 2000, it was easy to persuade individuals to invest in risk assets through 
defined contribution plans. 
In Japan, on the other hand, there has been no general shift to individual 
responsibility for investment returns following the introduction of defined contribution 
retirement plans in 2001.  Most large employers still manage retirement funds for 
employees and provide a lump-sum benefit upon retirement.  This benefit, 
supplemented by government social welfare payments and private sources such as 
insurance, is still sufficient for many Japanese to achieve a satisfactory retirement.  
There is therefore little necessity for many individuals in Japan to accept market risk in 
order to achieve higher returns on assets to be utilized for retirement (MOF [2001]).  
One continuing area of proposed reform is to shift investment responsibility to 
individuals and provide tax incentives for individual investment accounts (International 
Bankers Association [2010]). 
Finally, government policies have worked at cross-purposes for fiscal and political 
reasons, and have encouraged low-return investments.  One of the most significant 
issues remaining on the deregulatory agenda is the fate of Japan Post Bank, the former 
government post office which remains the largest deposit-taker in Japan.  In addition, 
large fiscal deficits and outstanding amounts of government debt have led the Japanese 
government to strongly encourage individual investors to invest in low-yielding 
government bonds.  Both Japan Post Bank deposits and government bonds had 
increased appeal to households as a safe haven following the 2008 financial crisis, and 
both were heavily advertised in media campaigns.   
One potential bright spot in this otherwise bleak picture is the recent asset increase 
by Japanese mutual funds and the continuing substantial share of personal assets held by 
institutional investors (see Table 2).  Pension funds, in particular, are held out as the 
hope for professional management of Japanese private assets, including the utilization 
of asset allocation strategies with significant exposure to equities and other risk assets.  
This trend includes professional management of government funds, as under a 19 
 
significant 2001 reform deposits from the postal bank are now professionally invested 
by the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) rather than being controlled and 
invested in pet programs by the MOF under the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program 
(FILP).  However, Japanese institutional investors remain more conservative in 
investments than their American counterparts (BOJ [2010b]).    
B. Market Allocation of Capital to Emerging Growth Industries 
It is difficult to identify or define “emerging growth companies” and therefore it is 
equally difficult to measure progress toward this goal.  There are data on the amount of 
bank loans going to small companies, and this number has been declining during the 
past decade.  However, although the term “start-up” creates an image that links 
innovation and small companies, the realty is less clear.  In Japan, it is, in fact, likely 
that the bulk of small businesses are companies that are in traditional,  low-growth 
industries rather than in emerging growth industries.   
However, to the extent that the “market” was going to allocate capital to emerging 
growth industries more efficiently than the traditional system of administrative guidance 
and risk-averse banks, a starting point might be to consider what market would perform 
this function.  In the United States, the venture capital market is an important source for 
financing of  emerging  growth  companies.  However, despite Japan’s early postwar 
history of entrepreneurs founding companies like Sony and Honda, in Japan today there 
is no robust market in venture capital or in private equity generally.  In 2009, venture 
firms invested some 88 billion yen in Japan, compared with the equivalent amount of 
532 billion yen in Europe and 1,592 billion yen in the U.S. (Venture Enterprise Center 
[2010] English figure 6).   
For evidence that markets have been unable to efficiently allocate capital to 
emerging growth industries, one need only look to recent government initiatives by the 
BOJ to provide special low-interest loans to banks for lending to emerging companies 
(BOJ [2010a]).  More generally, in 2010 the Japanese government proposed a national 
growth strategy of 10% across-the-board cuts in ministry budgets in order to create a 
new government-led growth fund, again evidencing frustration with the results of 
market activities. 20 
 
A number of explanations for Japan’s failure to develop an active venture capital 
market have been given.  Scholars in the U.S. have historically linked Japan’s weak 
venture capital market to its bank-centered financial system and weak stock market 
(Black and Gilson [1998] and Milhaupt [1997]).  Black and Gilson emphasized the 
importance of venture capitalists’ ability to exit from an investment through a stock IPO, 
and cited Japan’s lack of a liquid IPO market in the 1990s as the primary cause of 
Japan’s failure.  The stated reasons were that an IPO provides the greatest return to 
venture capitalists, thus encouraging them to invest and provide technology and 
expertise to early-stage companies, and also provides a method for the entrepreneur to 
temporarily cede control of the company to the venture capitalist and then regain control 
following the IPO.   
However, during the last decade a number of competing emerging company markets 
have developed in Japan, including the “Mothers” market of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
the “Hercules” market of the Osaka Stock Exchange (formerly Nasdaq-Japan) and the 
Jasdaq Securities Exchange.  In addition, changes in Japanese corporate law, including 
liberalization of options and preferred shares, now provide Japanese entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists the ability to make essentially the same deals as do Americans in 
Silicon Valley.  The necessary legal infrastructure for a venture capital market now 
“looks to be in place” (Shishido [2009] p. 2).  And in fact, IPOs constitute the chief exit 
strategy for investors in the small Japanese venture capital market (Venture Enterprise 
Center [2010] Japanese p. 1).  
If, like in the corporate bond market, there appears to be potential investor demand 
for venture capital-supported IPOs, we must again look elsewhere for an explanation for 
the lack of success in Japan’s emerging company markets.  The most persuasive answer 
appears to lie, once again, with the providers of capital and the persistence of traditional 
“bank-like” financing patterns.  Debt plays a large role in Japanese venture capital and 
venture funds often lack an equity focus and act like main banks.  Indeed, most venture 
funds in Japan are not independent, but rather are sponsored by banks and other 
financial institutions.  They are staffed by “salarymen,” dispatched from the parent 
organization, who have no economic incentive to assume risk.  Despite advances in the 
Japanese venture capital market over the past decade, the basic differences between 21 
 
suppliers of venture capital in Japan and the U.S., as described by Milhaupt in 1997, 
continue to persist today.   
This phenomenon largely accounts for the main factors cited for the lack of 
development of a Japanese venture capital market, i.e., a lack of risk capital and overly 
conservative investment strategies.  These factors result in the following:  (1) 
investment capital firms generally investing in late stage, rather than early stage, 
startups, (2) such firms also preferring to hold a diverse portfolio of small investments 
to limit risk, and (3) entrepreneurs also being risk-averse and fearful of failure.  
It should be noted that risk-averse attitudes of entrepreneurs in Japan may be 
rational since the consequences of failure may be greater in Japan than in the U.S.  In 
the U.S.,  bankruptcy filings by failed young companies are common and  it is not 
unusual for an entrepreneur to experience several failures before ultimately achieving 
success.  In Japan, bankruptcy is frowned upon and an entrepreneur might be pressured 
to utilize personal assets in the case of a corporate failure or have a contractual 
obligation with the venture capitalist to do so (Shishido [2009] p. 20); he would also be 
unlikely to receive a second chance. 
As evidence of risk aversion, we can look at the only study that ranks venture capital 
environments on a comparative basis through annual surveys.  The latest survey by 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) continues to show that Japan ranks lowest 
among 20 advanced countries surveyed in terms of entrepreneurial attitudes and 
perceptions (see Table 3).  However, Japan surprisingly has a relatively high score in 
the category of media attention for entrepreneurship.  The authors of the study note the 
anomaly that despite the media attention, perceived opportunities for starting a business 
are low and fear of failure is high (Bosma and Levie [2009] p. 18).  These findings were 
recently confirmed by a new survey employing a different methodology, the Global 
Entrepreneurship and Development Index, which also ranked Japan last among 
advanced countries (Acs and Szerb [2010]). 
The U.S. is the country with the most thriving venture capital market, and this could 
lead to questions about the use of the U.S. venture capital market as a standard in a 
bilateral comparison with Japan.  However, as with the corporate bond market, Japan 22 
 
also substantially trails Europe (Venture Enterprise Center [2010] English figure 6), and 
entrepreneurial attitudes in Japan rank last among a large cross-section of advanced 
economies.  Despite legal reform and the rise of liquid IPO markets, market participants 
have also failed to develop a robust venture capital market.  The carryover of risk-
averse banking practices to the nascent venture capital market appears to be an 
important factor hindering Japan’s financial system from supporting emerging growth 
industries. 
C. Tokyo as a Leading Financial Center 
Although Tokyo was widely regarded as a leading global financial center around 
1990, the bursting of the bubble  caused a dramatic decline from which Tokyo’s 
financial market never truly recovered.  The Nikkei 225 Average lost roughly 75% of its 
value and was unable to mount a sustained recovery during the following 20 years.  The 
market capitalization of the Tokyo Stock Exchange was larger than the New York Stock 
Exchange in 1990, but by 2009 it constituted less than one-third of the value of the New 
York Stock Exchange (see Table 4).  Tokyo had attracted stock listings from 127 
foreign companies in 1990, but this number  continually declined to a low of 17 
companies by 2009. 
Accordingly, one explicit goal of the Big Bang announced in 1996 was to restore the 
vigor of Tokyo’s financial market so that it would “be on a par with New York and 
London by 2001” (MOF [1997]).  It was anticipated that a robust capital market would 
provide substantial domestic benefits.  Such a financial market would both create a 
newly important financial services industry with high-paying jobs and a significant role 
in a post-industrial society, and also provide efficient financial support for other sectors 
of the Japanese economy including emerging growth industries.   
Beginning in the late 1990s, financial markets and deregulation also received greater 
attention internationally due to a new emphasis on international stock exchange 
competition. An influential  view developed that the “winner” in international stock 
market competition would be the market with the lowest regulatory standards that could 
attract the most foreign companies willing to cross-list on that stock exchange.  During 
the 2000s, this view was manifested in a vigorous debate in the United States as to 23 
 
whether New York was losing its competitiveness as a global financial center in favor 
of weaker regulation in the London market (Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 
[2006]). 
 The Tokyo Stock Exchange was the subject of even more dire warnings about its 
viability, as many observers saw stock exchange privatization, IPOs, and international 
mergers and acquisitions as leading to the formation of four global groups (led by the 
NYSE Euronext, Nasdaq OMX, CME, and Deutsche Börse) that would dominate equity 
and other trading.  Tokyo also had to face the presence of an Asian competitor, 
Singapore, which even more so than London was a stock exchange without a substantial 
domestic market whose long-standing strategy was to attract foreign issuers and active 
traders through permissive regulation.  
This issue seemed to disappear following the 2008 financial crisis, as the debate 
shifted to ways and means of strengthening  financial regulatory systems to restore 
investor confidence.  On an international level, this included greater cooperation among 
stock exchanges in enforcing securities laws.  In theoretical terms, the paradigm of a 
“race to the bottom” was now equaled or exceeded by a new “race to the top.”  The 
rising stock exchanges were markets with strong domestic bases such as Shanghai SE 
and  BM&Fbovespa (Rio de Janeiro)  rather than offshore centers seeking to attract 
traders and listings with weak regulation (see Table 4).   
The question of stock exchange competition and alliances returned with Singapore’s 
bid for the Australian stock exchange  in 2010.  This issue then re-emerged with a 
vengeance in February 2011 with the sudden disclosure of London’s bid for the Toronto 
stock exchange followed immediately by a stunning announcement  of a proposed 
merger between Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext.  However, the focus is now on 
business models rather than deregulation.  Discussions in 2007 were premised on an 
anticipated international harmonization of stock listing standards (which never occurred) 
and possible aggressive moves by stock exchanges to form global networks and 
dominate equity and other trading.  This time media reports view merger talks as an 
effort to gain global share in the more profitable derivatives markets.  Proposed mergers 
also represent defensive measures on equity trading as stock exchanges lose business to 
private electronic networks and seek efficiencies of scale. 24 
 
Authorities in Tokyo undertook significant deregulatory efforts after 2001 in an 
attempt to reinvigorate Tokyo’s financial market (Fuchita [2007]).  Government study 
groups and plans over the past decade on the issue of Tokyo’s competitiveness include a 
MOF study group in 2003, the Abe cabinet’s economic plan in 2005 and a FSA study 
group in 2007 (see Shirai [2009]).  If, however, substantial efforts at deregulation were 
ultimately not successful in revitalizing Tokyo’s financial market, we must consider 
other possible factors.   
Cross-listing decisions by individual corporations are not generally dictated by the 
level of regulation and the accompanying costs of compliance, but rather are subject to 
numerous practical factors.  These would include:  the desire to raise capital, the cost of 
capital and valuation of a company’s stock in that market, business connections in that 
market and increased visibility from a stock exchange listing, and geographic and 
cultural familiarity.   
In addition to a lack of cross-listing by foreign issuers, an even more striking failure 
of Tokyo’s financial market is its continued dominance by domestic Japanese securities 
firms.  A lingering suspicion remains that this is due to an unwelcoming attitude by the 
Japanese government.  There has, in fact, long been some ambiguity in the general plans 
that the Japanese government has put forward to make Tokyo a leading financial center.  
Is the primary goal to develop a strong and efficient Japanese financial services industry 
or, instead, to promote the creation of a strong international financial center at the 
possible cost of efficient international firms dominating Japanese firms (Toya [2006] pp. 
106-107)? 
Japanese government reports to date treat these two goals as compatible.  In fact, 
evidence from one market segment—foreign underwriters entering the samurai bond 
market following deregulation in 1995—suggests both that some Japanese issuers 
favored Japanese underwriters but that the entry of foreigners did increase competition 
and lower underwriting costs (Spiegel and Lopez [2009]).  However, as neither goal of 
creating an efficient Japanese domestic industry or a strong international financial 
center has been achieved, it is difficult to say which would be given priority in the case 
of conflict.  Foreigners note fears expressed in Japan about the theoretical possibility of 
rapid internationalization in Tokyo leading to domination by foreign firms in a 25 
 
“Wimbledon effect” (Pohl [2002]).   This phenomenon refers to the Wimbledon tennis 
tournament in London achieving world-class status at the cost of dominance by foreign 
players, and the same is said to apply to the financial market in London following its 
own Big Bang deregulation in 1986.      
However, like cross-listing decisions for individual foreign issuers, there are a 
variety of practical factors that affect the attractiveness of a financial center.  Various 
reasons are given for the steady decline of foreign firms in Tokyo’s financial market 
over the past decade (Makino [2007] p.  28), including taxes and administrative 
infrastructure.  Foreign firms often cite taxes, heavy regulation by the FSA, and 
insularity as reasons for this inability to attract widespread participation by foreign 
financial institutions.     
A simpler and more persuasive explanation for the weak foreign presence in Tokyo 
is that foreign financial institutions have limited interest in Japan’s stagnant market and 
are concentrating resources and expanding their presence in rapidly growing markets 
such as Shanghai and Hong Kong.  The Japanese government has proceeded with 
deregulatory efforts and certainly has undertaken no measures to exclude or discourage 
foreign participation in Tokyo’s financial market.  At the same time, however, it has 
also failed to implement many important measures unrelated to deregulation, such as tax 
relief, that are discussed in plans to enhance Tokyo’s attractiveness as an international 
financial center.  There is also no clear business strategy to distinguish Tokyo from 
other Asian markets and attract foreign interest by, for example, utilizing the scale of 
Japan’s economy and its vast financial resources to develop a leading corporate bond 
market in the region.     
In retrospect,  it seems likely that Tokyo’s perceived role as a leading financial 
center in 1990, with a large number of foreign companies listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, was an anomaly or a bubble.  At the time, Japan had the greatest amount of 
capital available and was generally valuing company stock at a very high level.  It was 
perhaps inevitable, or at least highly likely, that companies without a close business or 
other connections to Japan were attracted to a “hot” capital market, and that such 
companies would lose interest when the market cooled.  The issue of the competitive 26 
 
position of Tokyo’s financial market is sure to become prominent once again in light of 
the recent international merger announcements.   
V.    Conclusion 
The Big Bang initiative and ongoing reforms resulted in substantial deregulation of 
the banking, securities, and insurance industries, a regulatory style with greater 
information disclosure and transparency, and greater reliance on legal rules and market 
mechanisms than in the past.  Over the past 15 years, gradual progress was also made in 
slowly moving Japan from a system of indirect finance based on bank lending to a 
system of direct finance based on capital markets.   
However, this transformation remains incomplete, as governmental reform to date 
had only limited impact on the behavior of financial institutions and corporate 
borrowers.  Many of the anticipated benefits from capital market efficiency have not 
materialized.   
Even though Japan’s program of financial deregulation was more extensive than that 
undertaken in New York or London, it was not nearly as successful in growing Japan’s 
financial services industry or achieving other broad goals related to a service-oriented 
post-industrial society.  This result clearly illustrates the limits of what can be 
accomplished through financial deregulation alone and the necessary contribution of 
other important factors.  Japan faced very strong headwinds:  a debilitating banking 
crisis, poor economic growth and stock market performance, an aging society, 
deflationary pressure, mounting debts from government fiscal stimulus to keep the 
economy afloat, and unfortunate external shocks in 1997 and 2008.    
In the environment following the 2008 financial crisis, deregulation is no longer 
held out as the panacea to solve all economic and social problems.  Japan is now 
appropriately focusing on a broad range of policy measures to achieve the laudable 
goals associated with Big Bang reform efforts and restructuring of  the Japanese 
economy.  These include tax measures, such as an increase in consumption tax rates and 
a decrease in corporate tax rates, reform of the social security system, and new free 
trade agreements (particularly participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership).     27 
 
To continue the development of capital markets, researchers should devote greater 
attention to the reasons underlying the two great mysteries of Japan’s financial system:  
(1) the lack of a robust corporate bond market, and (2) the continuing low profitability 
of Japanese banks due to inefficient lending practices.  Policy-makers must develop 
means to break out of a vicious cycle:  traditional banking practices hinder development 
of the corporate bond market, and the lack of a viable corporate bond market as an 
alternative to bank lending acts to reinforce traditional banking practices.  
The most likely means to break this cycle would be to provide both carrots and 
sticks—a broad range of measures aimed specifically at this issue that both encourage 
the corporate bond market and discourage unprofitable banking practices.  Such 
measures should include areas like tax policy and administration, which heretofore have 
not been well integrated into overall government policy initiatives.  Additional efforts 
could also be made that focus specifically on the development of household investment, 
venture capital, and Tokyo’s financial market.     
The Big Bang achieved substantial, if by no means complete, success.  Changes in 
regulatory style for the financial services industry should facilitate continuing reform in 
that sector.  However, it is now also  time for other measures to make a greater 
contribution to Japan’s transition to a post-industrial society. 28 
 
 
Figure 1  Process of Big Bang Leading to Transformation to a 
Post-Industrial Society 
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Table 1  Corporate Finance (Liabilities of Nonfinancial Corporations) 
                    (Unit = trillion yen, percentage) 
  1980  (%)  1985  (%)  1990  (%)  1995  (%)  2000  (%)  2005  (%)  2009  (%) 
Loans  202  50.4  301  54.0  498  52.4  555  53.6  445  48.1  327  39.2  337  41.1 
Securities other than shares  197  4.8  31  5.6  79  8.3  76  7.3  74  8.0  71  8.5  72  8.7 
Shares and Other Equities  33  8.1  54  9.6  95  10.0  117  11.3  141  15.3  156  18.7  158  19.2 
Deposit money  27  6.8  36  6.4  60  6.3  58  5.6  42  4.5  37  4.4  3  4.5 
Inter-business credits  116  29.0  129  23.2  198  20.9  208  20.1  194  21.1  182  21.8  166  20.3 
Others  3  0.9  6  1.2  20  2.1  21  2.0  28  3.0  62  7.4  50  6.1 
Total  400  100.0  557  100.0  950  100.0  1,034  100.0  924  100.0  834  100.0  820  100.0 
                             
Source: Flow of Funds, Bank of Japan.                           
 
Table 2  Household Financial Assets 
                    (Unit = trillion yen, percentage) 
  1980  (%)  1985  (%)  1990  (%)  1995  (%)  2000  (%)  2005  (%)  2009  (%) 
Cash and Deposits  217  58.5  329  52.6  482  47.4  630  50.1  751  54.1  769  50.7  798  54.9 
Bonds  27  7.4  48  7.7  64  6.3  74  5.9  48  3.5  40  2.7  42  2.9 
Stocks and Other Equities  49  13.2  100  16.0  172  16.9  144  11.5  107  7.7  197  13.0  103  7.1 
Investment Trusts  4  1.2  14  2.3  34  3.4  29  2.3  34  2.4  52  3.4  55  3.8 
Insurance and Pension Reserves  50  13.4  102  16.3  212  20.8  319  25.4  378  27.2  391  25.8  393  27.0 
Others  24  6.3  33  5.2  53  5.2  61  4.8  70  5.1  67  4.4  62  4.3 
Total  372  100.0  627  100.0  1,017  100.0  1,256  100.0  1,389  100.0  1,517  100.0  1,453  100.0 
                             




























Belgium  15  37  28  5  46  49  33 
Denmark  34  35  37  3  47  75  25 
Finland  40  35  26  4  45  88  68 
France  24  27  47  16  65  70  50 
Germany  22  40  37  5  54  75  50 
Greece  26  58  45  15  66  68  32 
Hong Kong  14  19  37  7  45  55  66 
Iceland  44  50  36  15  51  62  72 
Israel  29  38  37  14  61  73  50 
Italy  25  41  39  4  72  69  44 
Japan  8  14  50  3  28  50  61 
Republic of Korea  13  53  23  11  65  65  53 
Netherlands  36  47  29  5  84  67  64 
Norway  49  44  25  8  63  69  67 
Slovenia  29  52  30  10  56  78  57 
Spain  16  48  45  4  63  55  37 
Switzerland  35  49  29  7  66  84  57 
United Arab 
Emirates  45  68  26  36  70  75  69 
United Kingdom  24  47  32  4  48  73  44 
United States  28  56  27  7  66  75  67 
average 
(unweighted)  28  43  34  9  58  69  53 
               
*Denominator: 18-64 population perceiving good opportunities to start a business.       
**Denominator: 18-64 population that is not involved in entrepreneurial activity.       
               




Table 4  10 Largest Stock Markets by Domestic Market Capitalization 
        (Unit = billion U.S. dollars) 
1990    1999    2009   
1. Tokyo SE  2,929  1. NYSE Euronext (US)  11,438  1. NYSE Euronext (US)  11,838 
2. NYSE Euronext (US)  2,692  2. Nasdaq OMX  5,205  2. Tokyo SE  3,306 
3. London SE  850  3. Tokyo SE  4,463  3. Nasdaq OMX  3,239 
4. Deutsch Börse  355  4. London SE  2,855  4. NYSE Euronext (Europe)  2,869 
5. Nasdaq OMX  311  5. NYSE Euronext (Europe)  2,444  5. London SE  2,796 
6. TSX Group  242  6. Deutsche Börse  1,432  6. Shanghai SE  2,705 
7. SIX Swiss EX  158  7. TSX Group  789  7. Hong Kong EX  2,305 
8. Borsa Italiana  149  8. Borsa Italiana  728  8. TSX Group  1,676 
9. Johannesburg SE  137  9. SIX Swiss EX  693  9. BME Spanish EX  1,435 
10. BME Spanish EX  111  10. Hong Kong EX  609  10. BM&Fbovespa  1,337 
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